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“Being oppressed means the absence of choices.”
– bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, a gay man can be called a “cocksucker” by his fellow employees
and the system of justice will close its doors to him, offering no legal remedy.
James Pittman faced vehement harassment and discrimination at his job
in Missouri at Cook Paper Recycling Corporation.1 Pittman’s fellow
employees taunted him by calling him a “cocksucker,” asking if he had



Drew Culler is a 2017 graduate of Wake Forest University School of Law. He would
like to thank Wendy Parker and Shannon Gilreath for their guidance and support. He
would also like to thank Lily and Finnigan for their unyielding loyalty and love.
1. Mark Joseph Stern, Gay Man Tormented at Work Then Fired for Being Gay Has
No Legal Recourse, Court Rules, SLATE.COM (Oct. 30, 2015, 11:48 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/10/30/anti_gay_harassment_missouri_man_
cannot_sue_for_sexual_orientation_discrimination.html.
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AIDS, and mocking his relationship with his boyfriend.2 Then, the company
fired him because of his sexual orientation.3 Pittman filed suit in state court,
alleging employment discrimination.4 The Missouri District Court and the
Western District Missouri Court of Appeals both ruled in favor of Cook
Paper, dismissing Pittman’s claims because Missouri law does not include
sexual orientation as a protected status in employment claims.5 Federal law
does not protect against sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace
either.6
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prevents
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7 Title VII was enacted in the midst of the Civil Rights
Movement to eliminate discriminatory employment practices that
disadvantage members of minorities.8 Further, the Americans with
Disabilities Act9 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act10 provide
federal protections for other groups. Yet, Congress has not passed federal
legislation to curb employment discrimination for the Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender (“LGBT”) community.11 Congress has introduced
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) into every session
since 1994, beside the 109th Congress, and has failed to enact it each time.12
Despite ENDA’s failure, courts still attempted to provide some protections
to the LGBT community through Title VII.13 However, courts are limited to
2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Zack Ford, Gay Man Was Harassed at Work for Being a “Cocksucker,” Court
Says It Won’t Do a Thing About It, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Oct. 30, 2015 8:00 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/10/30/3717515/missouri-discrimination-ruling/.
6. Stern, supra note 1.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
8. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
9. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
10. See generally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a), 623(a) (2012).
11. See The State of the Workplace for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Americans 2007-2008, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 2 (2009), http://www.hrc.org/files/
assets/resources/HRC_Foundation_State_of_the_Workplace_2007-2008.pdf.
12. Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act: It’s Past
Time to Pass This Law, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 19, 2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-theemployment-non-discrimination-act/.
13. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the defendant violated Title VII due to sex discrimination, not sexual
orientation discrimination, because a man had feminine mannerisms).
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the language of Title VII and state law, which usually mirrors the language
of Title VII. Since sexual orientation is not expressly included among Title
VII’s other protected classes, courts have tried to fit a square peg in a round
hole by likening sexual orientation to sex or sex stereotypes.14 Other courts
simply argued that Congress did not include sexual orientation
discrimination, so there is no recourse for such harassment.15 In DeSantis v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the court plainly stated that the
“prohibition of sex discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis
of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference
such as homosexuality.”16 One court even called relief from sexual
orientation discrimination “wholly inappropriate” under Title VII’s
language.17
Most courts, however, use the standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins (“Price Waterhouse”) of “sex stereotyping” to protect victims of
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.18 Price Waterhouse held
that it is a violation of Title VII to deny an employment benefit to an
employee based on traditional stereotypes associated with his or her sex.19
However, as decided in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center, the Price
Waterhouse standard only covers appearances or behaviors that are gender
non-conforming.20 Curbing discrimination based on gender non-conforming
behavior does not provide all members of the LGBT community protection;
in fact, it only provides protections for those members of the LGBT
community who express gender in a way that does not comport with societal
norms.21
14. See id. at 874.
15. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding

that the plaintiff had no recourse because sexual orientation is not included in Title VII’s
protected classifications); see also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257,
265 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Harassment on the basis of sexual orientation has no place in our
society. Congress has not yet seen fit, however, to provide protection against such
harassment.”).
16. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a homosexual male teacher did not state an appropriate harassment claim
because he was not treated any differently than his heterosexual colleagues, even though
he was called “faggot” at work).
18. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2009)
(finding that a gay man’s “effeminacy and lack of conformity” to gender stereotypes was
enough to survive a motion for summary judgment under Title VII).
19. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1989).
20. See Vickers, 453 F.3d at 766 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
21. See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities,
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I argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, while
successful in the context of gender and sex discrimination, when applied to
sexual orientation discrimination provides an unworkable and unrealistic
standard that reduces the lives of LGBT members to binary, gendered
conformities. In doing so, the judiciary severely misunderstands the lives
and identities of members of the LGBT community and the harassment many
face in the workplace. Price Waterhouse paints in broad strokes, blurring
the multi-faceted genders, behaviors, and lives of the LGBT community by
wrongfully assuming that all sexual orientation harassment is rooted in
gender non-conformity. I argue that sexual orientation harassment, although
sometimes rooted in gender, cannot be conflated entirely with sex
harassment under Title VII. In doing so, courts reduce gayness to a series of
behaviors and appearances, instead of a deeply-rooted identity in need of
federal protection.
In Part II, I explore various federal cases that conflate sexual orientation
discrimination with sex discrimination. Although a rare few of these courts
may allow a gay plaintiff to prevail in a claim of sex discrimination,22 many
do so through the Price Waterhouse standard of sex stereotyping, and not
because the harassment was directed toward sexual orientation.
In Part III, I argue that it is improper to view sexual orientation
discrimination through the lens of sex or gender discrimination. Doing so
ultimately blurs the lines between sex and sexual orientation to the detriment
of the LGBT community. Although it may be true that gender and sexual
orientation discrimination are intertwined, conflating the two essentially
erases the struggles and identities of LGBT lives and, in its wake, reinforces
stereotypes. Conflating sexual orientation discrimination to gender or sex
discrimination reduces gayness to a series of appearances and behaviors,
protecting perceived sexual orientation instead of gayness itself. Further, the
Price Waterhouse standard privileges some members of the LGBT
community over others; members of the LGBT community that are gender
non-conforming are privileged, while members of the LGBT community
who may be gender conforming are left unprotected, even though they may
suffer from sexual orientation discrimination. Further, I argue that the Price
Waterhouse standard privileges transgender individuals who conform to the
gender binary over lesbian, gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) individuals who do
conform.
In Part IV, I discuss possible alternatives to the Price Waterhouse
framework that will allow all members of the LGBT community to be
and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715 (2010).
22. See, e.g., Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291.
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protected from workplace discrimination, particularly LGB individuals. For
the LGBT community to achieve such protection, the legislature must pass
ENDA or amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, courts may look
at sex discrimination differently than they have under the Price Waterhouse
decision in order to provide protection to all, not only some, members of the
LGBT community.
II. PRICE WATERHOUSE AND THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION CONUNDRUM
In Price Waterhouse, the Court held that Title VII protects employees who
may not display traditional appearances and behaviors of gender.23 In Price
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was denied a promotion after receiving positive
reviews.24 The partners of Price Waterhouse described Hopkins as having
“strong character, independence, and integrity,” and being an “outstanding
professional.”25 However, partners at Price Waterhouse denied Hopkins’
promotion because of her abrasiveness and masculine behavior.26 Some
partners said that Hopkins should learn to “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry.”27 Although Hopkins displayed “masculine” characteristics,
there is no evidence that she was bisexual or a lesbian.
The Court held that Price Waterhouse’s discriminatory actions were of a
mixed motive; in other words, Hopkins was denied a promotion because of
legitimate and illegitimate discriminatory reasons.28 The discriminatory
reasons were based on sex stereotypes, which is impermissible sex
discrimination under Title VII.29
Courts have taken this sex stereotyping approach and applied it to cases
alleging sexual orientation discrimination, wrongfully assuming that
members of the LGBT community inherently display deviant physical or
behavioral characteristics that are gender non-conforming. Although many
members of the LGBT community, especially transgender people, may
display gender non-conforming behavior that may pass the Price
Waterhouse standard, many do not.
For example, in Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., the Third Circuit
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234
See id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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held that discrimination against a gay man who was effeminate and displayed
female-like characteristics, was actionable under Title VII.30 Prowel spoke
in a high voice, walked femininely, and supposedly sat “the way a woman
would sit.”31 Prowel suffered verbal harassment from his fellow employees,
who called him “faggot” and accused him of having AIDS.32 Unlike
Hopkins, however, Prowel was known to be a homosexual and was harassed
because of his sexual orientation, not his gender.33 However, because Prowel
displayed feminine traits, instead of traditional, gender-conforming male
traits, the Third Circuit held that the employer allowed discrimination based
on sex under Title VII through the use of the Price Waterhouse precedent.
In allowing Prowel’s suit to go forward as a violation of sex discrimination
under Title VII, the Third Circuit delegitimized sexual orientation
discrimination as secondary to gender or sex stereotypes. This is partly
because Congress has forced courts to do so.34 The court stated that “the line
between sexual orientation discrimination and discrimination ‘because of
sex’ can be difficult to draw,”35 implying that sexual orientation and sex
stereotypes are inextricably intertwined. As Brian Soucek states, “In
Prowel’s case, so-called sexuality discrimination [is] reduced entirely to
harassment based on gender nonconformity.”36
However, many of the actions or behaviors that Prowel exhibited cannot
be directly linked to typically “feminine” behavior. Prowel’s own testimony
was that employees made fun of him for wearing nice men’s clothes, keeping
a clean car, and pressing buttons on a piece of equipment with “pizzazz” to
the point where coworkers threatened to shoot “all the fags.”37 Surely
wearing nice men’s clothing, keeping a car clean, and pressing buttons with
“pizzazz” are not stereotypical behaviors of a female. Instead, these are
stereotypical behaviors of male gayness. The stereotypical behavior that
Prowel was criticized for was not because of his sex or gender, but because
of his sexual orientation. Prowel should have won his case for the struggles
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291 (3rd Cir. 2009).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287-88.
See id. at 287.
See id. at 290 (“Despite acknowledging that harassment based on sexual
orientation has no place in a just society, we explained that Congress chose not to include
sexual orientation harassment in Title VII.”) (citing Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001)).
35. Id. at 291.
36. Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63
AM. U. L. REV 715, 735 (2014).
37. See Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287.
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he endured because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sex.
A court may argue that Prowel’s behavior is, in fact, rooted in gender
discrimination or sex stereotypes because Prowel did not act within the
typical masculine role. In other words, some may argue that the behavior
exhibited by a plaintiff bringing a sexual orientation discrimination claim
does not need to mirror the opposite gender’s stereotypical behavior in order
for the claim to stand. However, in Anderson v. Napolitano, the gay plaintiff,
Anderson, was denied a Title VII claim based on sex discrimination, even
though the harassment was due, in large part, to stereotypical “gay”
behavior.38 Anderson’s fellow employees harassed him by talking to him in
a flamboyant voice with a lisp, a trait typically associated with a stereotypical
version of a gay man.39 The District Court reasoned that lisping is not a
gender-conforming trait of women, but a stereotype of a gay man.40 The
District Court dismissed Anderson’s Title VII claim for employment
discrimination because of sex, or sex stereotypes, because those stereotypical
traits did not conform to how a woman would act.41
Thus, under Title VII, a gay man is not faulted for being gay, but for not
being gay enough. Under Title VII, through the lens of Price Waterhouse,
the gay man who exhibits stereotypical behaviors or characteristics is the one
who wins the prize, not the gay man who is harassed purely because of his
gayness, as evidenced in Anderson. In essence, under Price Waterhouse, in
order to prevail on a Title VII claim, a gay man must project himself
effeminately and a lesbian must act masculine.42 As seen in Anderson, this
test is unworkable and often undermines the intricacies of LGBT life because
it protects gay stereotypes and not gay people.
The protection of gay stereotypes, instead of gay people, is evident in
Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center.43 In Vickers, the plaintiff befriended a
38. See Anderson v. Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10422,
at *19 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010).
39. See id. at *4.
40. See id. at *17.
41. See id. at *19.
42. It is important to note that courts have trapped themselves in the gender binary,
which leaves little relief for bisexuals, as well as gay men and women who do act within
their gender-specific roles. Bisexual plaintiffs would have to prove, like any gay plaintiff,
that he or she is being discriminated against because of sex stereotyping. This claim,
however, is unlikely to prevail because courts wrongfully assume that gender nonconformity is inherently attached to sexual practices. In a practical sense, a bisexual in
the workplace would rarely be discriminated against because of his or her gender nonconformity, but because of his or her sexual preferences, leaving that person with no
legal recourse.
43. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
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male homosexual employee and went on a vacation to Florida with another
man.44 He was then subjected to daily instances of discrimination from his
fellow employees, who called him names, put chemicals in his food, and
played him recordings of anti-gay conversations.45 Vickers asserted a Title
VII claim for sex discrimination based on the paradigms set forth in Price
Waterhouse, but the Sixth Circuit denied his claim, stating that a favorable
result for Vickers would “have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to
encompass sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination.”46 The
court further stated, “In all likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual
orientation would be actionable under a sex stereotyping theory if this claim
is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to
traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”47 The court knowingly
stated that a sex-stereotyping claim under Title VII is only for those gays
who behave, in a non-sexual way, like a stereotype.
Thus, like the court in Vickers, courts imply that they will only protect gay
people who exhibit stereotypical behaviors or appearances of gayness.48 A
gay man is only protected from employment discrimination when he is a
sissy, a fag, or an otherwise effeminate gay man. A lesbian will only have
protection when she is a dyke. Courts will not protect other “presentations”
of gayness, or perceived gayness, that may be gender conforming, or may
not be stereotypical enough. The Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping
structure, as courts have typically applied it, is simply not a broad enough
standard to encompass all members of the LGBT community, especially
LGB individuals.
III. REDUCING GAYNESS TO APPEARANCES AND BEHAVIORS
REINFORCES STEREOTYPES AND FAILS TO PROTECT THE LGBT
COMMUNITY
Through the Title VII lens of Price Waterhouse, members of the LGBT
community can only recover from sexual orientation discrimination when
they fit the description of a stereotypical gay man or lesbian.49 Under this
framework, the LGBT community is reduced to behaviors and appearances
44. See id. at 759. It should also be noted that the plaintiff in Vickers never indicated
his sexual preferences. However, for the sake of this analysis, the employer and his
fellow employees treated him as if he is, in fact, a gay man, and discriminated against
because of that belief.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 764.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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and the individual struggles endured in the workplace are ignored. Indeed,
courts have recognized this problem. In a 2005 case, the Second Circuit
claimed that “one can fail to conform to gender stereotypes in two ways: (1)
through behavior, or (2) through appearance.”50 However, this shallow
distinction fails lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals while privileging some
members of the transgender community who conform to one gender.
Ultimately, the Price Waterhouse framework forces members of the LGBT
community to repress themselves, and act in a stereotypical way in order to
gain protection under Title VII.
A. Title VII Protection for the LGB Community
The Price Waterhouse distinction between behavior and appearance fails
to protect “normal” members of the LGB community—that is, LGB
members who are gender conforming—yet protects stereotypical LGB
individuals when they exhibit behaviors and appearances of the opposite
gender. However, the Price Waterhouse standard for sex stereotyping
effectuates and perpetuates LGB stereotypes and fails to protect all members
of the LGB community collectively. It is an unworkable and nonsensical
standard as applied to LGB individuals, as it only protects gay appearances
and behaviors, and not homosexual sex acts, even though homosexual sex
acts can be interpreted to be a violation of a traditional sex stereotypes. The
Price Waterhouse standard also divides LGB individuals into “normal” and
“stereotypical” categories, reducing the struggles and lives of LGB people to
simply behavior and appearances. This distracts from the fact that members
of the LGB community are discriminated against because of their sexual
orientation, not because of their gender non-conformity, and undermines the
purpose of Title VII.
First, the Price Waterhouse framework of sex stereotypes is an
unworkable standard that is unnecessarily narrow. The Price Waterhouse
standard only protects from sex stereotyping in the LGB community by
behavior and appearance, but not through sexual acts, even though sexual
orientation, not sex or gender, may be the cause of the discrimination.51
However, courts ignore the fact that sexual acts with a member of the same
sex could be construed as sex stereotyping itself under Price Waterhouse.
Since heterosexual sex is a normative act, a homosexual act could be
construed as violating a traditional sex stereotype. In other words,
50. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005).
51. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 288, 239 (1989) (clarifying that

although Congress passed Title VII to make sex, color, race, religion, and national origin
impermissible factors for employment decisions, it did not purport to limit other factors
employers may consider).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017

9

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2017], Art. 4

518

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 25:4

heterosexual sex acts are sex stereotypes in and of themselves. If an
employee is discriminated against based on his or her homosexual sex acts,
courts could interpret that discrimination as impermissible sex stereotyping.
Under Price Waterhouse, courts should find that sex discrimination under
Title VII encompasses homosexual sex acts because “real men should only
sleep with women, not other men.”52
However, courts have narrowed the Price Waterhouse standard to exclude
discrimination based on the employee’s perceived or actual homosexual
activity, and instead include only the behavior and appearance of the
employee. For example, an employee could be fired if he brings his samesex partner to an office holiday party and holds his partner’s hand or kisses
him in front of his colleagues.53 In the case of Robin Shahar, a lesbian
attorney who held a same-sex commitment ceremony with her partner in
Georgia, her employer rescinded her job offer after finding out about her
homosexual relationship with another woman.54 The court dismissed her
employment discrimination claim, not because she did not exhibit any signs
of gender non-conformity, but because she was in a relationship with another
woman, which the court reasoned did not amount to impermissible sex
stereotyping under Price Waterhouse.55 Because claims like these involve
homosexual activity, courts will not offer recourse under Price Waterhouse,
even though it is a sex stereotype to be romantically or sexually involved
with someone of the same sex.56
The analysis of sexual orientation employment discrimination should
extend further to rightfully adhere to the anti-sex stereotyping standard set
forth in Price Waterhouse. Allowing suits to go forward on behavior or
appearance, but not on homosexual activity, is nonsensical and unnecessarily
narrow. In essence, “Price Waterhouse also implies that the use of the
stereotypes that men and women should be heterosexual violates Title VII”

52. See Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding the
Plaintiff’s claim can stand because his coworkers found him to be effeminate, but not
because he dated other men).
53. See I. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1158, 1182-83 (1991) (inventing this hypothetical situation to illustrate the narrowness
of the Price Waterhouse framework).
54. Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 15, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/magazine/15gays.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
[hereinafter Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover].
55. See id.
56. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A
Claim of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1992).
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under sex stereotyping.57 The needless distinction between behavior,
appearance, and homosexual activity undermines the entire purpose of Title
VII, which is to protect individuals from workplace discrimination.58
Next, the Price Waterhouse framework effectuates otherness and
homophobia by separating LGB members into “normal” and “stereotypical”
groups.59 The Vickers and Prowel cases present a bizarre distinction: in order
to receive protection from employment discrimination, gays must first
become the stereotype. In doing so, however, courts are sending a message
to gays that they must become what is hated—the sissy, the fag, the dyke—
to be legally protected.60 I do not mean to blame members of the LGB
community if individuals are gender non-conforming or act effeminate or
masculine for seeking, and rightfully winning, judicial recourse. Instead, I
argue that the Price Waterhouse framework forces the LGB community to
stifle its individuality and to present itself in a stereotypical way to gain legal
protection.
Price Waterhouse erases the intricacies of LGB lives and, instead,
encourages stereotyping and assimilation into a stereotype.
Price
Waterhouse forces LGB individuals into a corner; LGB employees must
choose to either become a stereotype and win a Title VII claim at the cost of
experiencing harmful and dangerous harassment at work, or to act “straight,”
or gender conforming and possibly yield less discrimination. However, if
there is discrimination based on that person’s homosexual life or actions, her
Title VII claim will fail. Essentially, the Price Waterhouse standard forces
LGB people to flaunt a stereotyped version of their sexuality or not reveal
anything about their lives that would indicate homosexuality.
However, the “flaunting homosexual will generally get less sympathy than
the discreet one,” in the workplace or in other public settings.61 In a 2002
study about employment and parenting cases, individuals whose
homosexuality was discreet, or kept completely private, kept their jobs and
their children more often than those whose homosexuality was “notorious”
or “flagrant.”62 The “flagrant” homosexual may be in need of more
protections than the “discreet” one, but only at the cost of being a stereotype

57. Id. at 24 n.96.
58. Capers, supra note 53, at 1184-85.
59. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 850 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino,

Covering].
60. See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009).
61. See Yoshino, Covering, supra note 59.
62. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 101
(2006) [hereinafter YOSHINO, THE HIDDEN ASSAULT].
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of the “flagrant” and “flaunting” homosexual.63 Some law scholars, like
Brian Soucek, argue that the Price Waterhouse framework incentivizes gays
to be extreme characterizations of gay stereotypes in order to receive Title
VII protection.64 However, Soucek ignores the risks taken by members of
the LGBT community who must become stereotypes. LGB individuals who
are gender non-conforming, or fit the more stereotypical version of a
homosexual, are more likely to face discrimination and violence inside and
outside of the employment context.65 A “flagrant” homosexual may be
covered by Title VII at some point in the future, but must endure occasionally
violent and serious harassment to trigger Title VII protection. Assuming that
LGB individuals will purposefully “flaunt” themselves, as Soucek suggests,
ignores the reality that, in order to avoid discrimination and harassment in
the first place, LGB people may “cover” themselves with heteronormative
sex stereotypes.66
“Covering” is a term coined by Kenji Yoshino that is similar to “passing”
when discussing race.67 However, he distinguishes “covering” from
“passing” by stating that passing pertains to the “visibility of a characteristic,
while covering pertains to its obtrusiveness.”68 Covering is essentially
pretending to be somebody else to protect oneself from discrimination or
harassment, no matter how minute.69 In essence, “covering” is hiding in the
closet; to protect oneself from discrimination, an LGB person has to “closet”
him or herself. Under Price Waterhouse, “covering” is more likely than an
LGB person pretending to be a stereotype, which puts them at risk of
discrimination, simply for Title VII protection. Thus, a LGB person is likely
to “cover” to prevent the discrimination in the first place.70
Price Waterhouse creates this dilemma, leaving members of the LGB
63. See id. at 93. Interestingly, the LGBT community is subject to the same issue in
asylum cases. In order to seek asylum, a person must show that that she has a “wellfounded fear of persecution.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Hence, like in Title VII claims, there
is a greater likelihood that someone will achieve legal protection if she can exhibit
physical behaviors and appearances that lead to a potential for discrimination. Thus,
asylum-seekers need to be “gay enough” to prevail. See also Soucek, supra note 36, at
775 n.379.
64. Soucek, supra note 36, at 783.
65. See YOSHINO, THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 62.
66. See Soucek, supra note 36, at 783. But see Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover,
supra note 54.
67. Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, supra note 54.
68. See id.
69. See id. (providing an example of covering by stating Margaret Thatcher took
voice lessons to make her voice lower so she would not be too “feminine”).
70. See id.
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community with two options: (1) heedlessly flaunt stereotypical ideas of gay
“behavior” and “appearance” to achieve Title VII protection but risk
dangerous harassment or discrimination, or (2) closet oneself and suppress
one’s LGB identity to avoid discrimination in the first place. Although Price
Waterhouse offers protection to some people in the LGB community, it
divides LGB identity and ultimately suppresses it.
B. Title VII Protection for Transgender People
Just as Price Waterhouse privileges a type of caricaturized gayness, it also
privileges some transgender individuals over LGB people. A number of
courts have indicated that transgender people have a Title VII claim because
their identities are more closely tied to sex or gender stereotypes.71 Recently,
the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of a transgender employee of the Library of
Congress under the Price Waterhouse standard of impermissible sex
stereotyping.72 Although the court stated that the plaintiff’s claim could have
rested on discrimination based on transgender status, which is not protected
under Title VII, the court indicated that the evidence for transgender
discrimination looks very similar to evidence of impermissible sex
stereotyping under Price Waterhouse.73 Therefore, the Price Waterhouse
standard makes Title VII protection easier for some members of the
transgender community than it does for members of the LGB community.
However, transgender people must still identify within the gender binary to
receive Title VII protection.
On the other hand, Title VII claims do not offer sweeping or broad
protections for transgender people either. Many courts separate evidence of
discrimination based on transgender status from sex discrimination and find
that Title VII does not protect transgender people.74 Other courts limit the
applicability of Price Waterhouse for transgender people.
However, the trend is for courts to protect transgender discrimination
under Title VII through Price Waterhouse because transgender issues are so
closely intertwined with gender and sex.75 For example, in Schwenk v.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See McGinley, supra note 21, at 750.
See Shroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008).
See id. at 308.
See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“[D]iscrimination against a transsexual because she is a transsexual is not
‘discrimination based on sex.’ Therefore, transsexuals are not a protected class under
Title VII and [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy her prima facie burden on the basis of her status
as a transsexual.”).
75. See, e.g., Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 528 (D. Conn.
2016) (denying the employer’s motion for summary judgment where a transgendered
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Hartford, a prison guard sexually assaulted a pre-operative male-to-female
transgender inmate.76 The court, in deciding whether or not Schwenk had a
claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, relied on the Title VII
definitions of sex and gender discrimination.77 The court found that Title
VII, through the lens of Price Waterhouse, protects transgender individuals
because Schwenk, who was biologically a male, appeared and behaved
femininely and her attacker was fully aware of Schwenk’s plan to transition
to female.78
Schwenk indicates that impermissible sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse is sometimes more easily proven in cases of transgender
discrimination than sexual orientation discrimination, as long as the plaintiff
is transitioning from one binary gender to the other. In Schwenk, the court
found sex-based discrimination under Title VII simply because the plaintiff
was born with male genitalia, but presented as a female.79 The court stated,
“Thus, the evidence offered by Schwenk tends to show that [the prison
guard’s] actions were motivated, at least in part, by Schwenk’s gender . . .
by her assumption of a feminine rather than a typical masculine appearance
or demeanor.”80 A biological male who dresses, talks, or acts like a female,
whether transgender or not, is inherently gender non-conforming.81 One
court even expressly held that a transgender female-to-male person was not
protected under sexual orientation discrimination, but instead was covered
by gender discrimination based on Price Waterhouse.82 In that case, the
court held that “discrimination against a man because he was wearing a dress
could constitute sex discrimination.”83 Although transgender identity is
undoubtedly more than a “man in a dress,” the court in Enriquez v. West
Jersey Health Systems would seemingly grant Title VII protection for that
“man in a dress.”84 A transgender person that is within the gender binary
would fit into the Enriquez court’s interpretation of Price Waterhouse.
employee could not show that she was denied employment because of her transgender
identity).
76. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000).
77. Id. at 1200-02 (showing that the language of the Gender Motivated Violence
Act mirrors Title VII language).
78. Id. at 1202.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See Shroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 335 (D.D.C. 2008).
82. See Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 777 A.2d 365, 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
83. Id. at 372 (citing Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000)).
84. See id.
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However, the Price Waterhouse standard does not protect all members of
the transgender community. First, as discussed, only some circuits provide
Title VII protection to transgender individuals.85 Second, Price Waterhouse
only protects those who exhibit appearances and behaviors of the opposite
binary gender. Sometimes, a transgender plaintiff must do more than exhibit
non-male or non-female appearances and behaviors. Instead, the transgender
plaintiff must exhibit appearances and behaviors of the opposite binary
gender, not something in between.86
Lastly, some courts have allowed employment discrimination when a
transgender plaintiff exhibits behaviors or appearances of the opposite
gender outside of work, but not during work. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie
Louisiana, Inc., the court rejected the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and sex
stereotyping claims under Price Waterhouse because he was fired for
dressing as a woman outside of work.87 Because he never dressed as a
woman at work, he could not prove he was terminated for impermissible sex
stereotypes, despite direct evidence of his termination for dressing as a
woman outside of the workplace.88 The court’s reasoning indicates an
employer has the power to dictate how a transgender person acts inside and
outside the workplace.89
For courts that do recognize transgender individuals under Title VII,
however, the proof required is much easier for transgender plaintiffs than
LGB plaintiffs simply because transgender discrimination is directly linked
to sex stereotyping and gender discrimination. A plaintiff, who is
biologically one sex, exhibits behaviors and appearances linked to the
opposite gender, and is discriminated against, could inherently prove
impermissible sex stereotyping under the Price Waterhouse standard.90 LGB
people do not have such proof available to them under current interpretation
of Price Waterhouse because gayness, although intertwined with gender
stereotypes, is not dispositive of a sex stereotype.

85. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that “transsexuals” are not a protected class under Title VII).
86. See Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 372.
87. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741,
at *37 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
88. See id. at *30.
89. See McGinley, supra note 21, at 759.
90. See Shroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008).
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IV. TITLE VII AND LGBT RIGHTS IN THE FUTURE: SOLVING THE
PRICE WATERHOUSE PROBLEM
All members of the LGBT community should be protected by Title VII
law because doing so would further the legislative purpose of the law.91 To
protect the entire LGBT community, the easiest way to solve the unworkable
and unevenly applied Price Waterhouse standard would be to enact ENDA
into law. However, the language of ENDA, as proposed, may repeat the
problems of Price Waterhouse. The ENDA bill, as proposed, would prevent
discrimination based on “actual perceived sexual orientation or gender.”92
This language indicates that the employer must be aware of the plaintiff’s
sexual orientation or gender identity. Importantly, any ENDA bills that may
eventually become law must indicate how a plaintiff proves a claim.
Otherwise, courts may continue to use Price Waterhouse as the framework
to indicate how an employer might know if someone is LGBT. If courts
continue to use the Price Waterhouse framework after ENDA, the
supposedly inclusive bill would provide no additional protections because
proving gayness would simply revert back to proving impermissible sex
stereotyping. For instance, plaintiffs like Vickers may fall through the Price
Waterhouse cracks. He was not known to be gay, nor was he perceived to
be gay through his appearances or behaviors, yet he faced terrible
discrimination.93 Where would he fit in ENDA?
ENDA, as well as courts, would need to set forth new standards that would
ideally include both sex stereotyping and discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity.94 Proving discrimination based on bisexuality
might also be problematic. Some less sympathetic judges may decide
someone engaging in acts of bisexuality could be “experimenting,” and
recovery under “true” sexual orientation could be precluded.95 Furthermore,
if ENDA is to be enacted, it must use specific language defining genderidentity and transgender. If not, less sympathetic courts may decide that a
person is not truly transgender until they’ve had sex reassignment surgery.96
If ENDA is not enacted, however, courts could expand the meaning of
91. See Capers, supra note 53, at 1187.
92. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4, 9

(2013).
93. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2006),
94. For example, if a gay male plaintiff can establish that he was discriminated
against for being a “sissy,” he could prove a Title VII violation. The same plaintiff should
also be able to establish a Title VII violation for sexual orientation discrimination if he
can establish that he was harassed due to having a same-sex partner.
95. McGinley, supra note 21, at 771.
96. Id.
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“discrimination based on sex” and impermissible sex stereotypes under Price
Waterhouse. This would entail a simple re-reading of Price Waterhouse to
recognize that having a sexual or romantic relationship with someone of the
same sex inherently creates impermissible sex stereotyping. Although critics
might consider it judicial activism, courts “should not be restrained when
[their decision] is in furtherance of legislative intent.”97 However, this is a
judicial pipe dream. Courts would undoubtedly be reluctant to reinterpret
Price Waterhouse without a Supreme Court decision, which, in the current
political climate, does not seem likely. However, even if Price Waterhouse
was reinterpreted, it would not help the plaintiff in Oiler, who was fired for
behavior outside of the workplace.98 Further, reinterpreting a Title VII
standard may shake the ground of well-established Civil Rights Act
standards. If courts could add protected classes under Title VII or reinterpret a Supreme Court standard, like Price Waterhouse, there would be
a greater likelihood that conservative legislators may take protections away
from protected classes by amending Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
Members of the LGBT community deserve Title VII protection for the
countless instances of employment discrimination. However, under the
current framework, certain members of the LGBT community are privileged
over others, and the Price Waterhouse standard is applied unfairly and
bizarrely. Also, Price Waterhouse forces members of the LGBT community
to either risk harassment to receive Title VII protection, or closet themselves
to avoid discrimination and harassment altogether. However, the future of
LGBT Title VII rights seems bleak, as ENDA continually stops short of
Congressional approval, and courts would be reluctant to reinterpret Price
Waterhouse.99 While members of Congress fight over LGBT rights, and
members of the judiciary continually draw inexplicable lines between sex
and sexual orientation discrimination, LGBT people go unprotected in the
workplace. Even though it is unclear what the future of Title VII holds for
97. Capers, supra note 53, at 1186.
98. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741,

at * 11-14 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).
99. It should be noted that ENDA would not be the be-all-to-end-all of LGBT
protections. For example, the version of ENDA presented to the 113th Congress
contained religious exemption provisions such that major LGBT advocacy groups
removed their support for the bill. See Jennifer Bendery, Gay Rights Groups Pull Support
of ENDA’s Sweeping Religious Exemption, HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Aug. 5,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/enda-religious-exemption_n_
5568736.html.
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the LGBT community, it is clear that the future of Title VII will either
continue to reduce and fragment LGBT identity, or it will allow for a fuller
realization of LGBT identity outside of behavior and appearance.
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